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The FTC's Newly Recognized Power to Issue
Substantive Intra-Agency Rules
-- orWhy the Sleeping Beauty of Section 6(g)
Was Awakened By Court Order
Powers long . . . unexercised are not lost by being allowed to

lie dormant, any more than nonexistent powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise.
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
National Petroleum Refiners
Association v. FTC (1973).
SUMMARY

For almost half a century the Federal Trade Commission has attemptted to regulate commerce without using the kind of binding substantive
rules issued by other independent regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications
Commission. How this has affected the Commission's regulatory performance, as perceived by the Commission itself and by outside observers is reviewed. The Commission's successful attempt to assert
such rule-making power in recent years by creating a new type of substantive rule consistent with the Commission's narrow authorizing statute is chronicled, and the merits of a recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decision sustaining this new type of rule are analyzed.
BACKGROUND

The Federal Trade Commission Act' declares that "unfair methods
of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce are . . . unlawful." 2

One who commits acts made "un-

lawful" by the statute cannot for that reason alone be sued privately for
damages, 3 but the Act permits the Commission, after a proper administrative hearing, to serve such person with an order to "cease and desist
from using such method of competition or such act or practice."'4 A
person ordered to cease and desist may obtain review of the Commis1. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FICA].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
3. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926); Carisen
v. Coca-Cola, 318 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1970).

4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
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sion's order in the appropriate circuit court of appeals at a proceeding
where "the finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive."' Failure to obey a cease and desist order after it has become final makes the offending party liable to the
United States for a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each viola6
tion. Each day of a continuing offense is deemed a separate violation.
Orders of the FTC are not intended to impose criminal punishment or
exact compensatory damages for past acts; rather, they are intended
to prevent illegal practices in the future.'
The FTC was designed to prevent acts and practices condemned by
the Sherman Antitrust Acte and the Clayton Act 9 as well as the unfair competitive practices already illegal at common law, such as "passing off' one's goods as those of another. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment1" made explicit the Commission's power to halt unfair or deceptive practices in commerce that are harmful to the public interest even
if they do not injure competition 1 and gave the Commission additional
powers to deal with false advertisements of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics by obtaining a temporary injunction from an appropriate United
States district court.
In addition to the enforcement duties set out in Section 5 of the
FTCA, Section 6 of the Act gives the Commission broad powers to
make investigations of, and require both special and annual reports
from, any corporation engaged in commerce except banks and common2
carriers subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission.'
Section 7 of the FTCA gives the Commission the further duty to act as
a master in chancery when called upon by the court in any antitrust suit
in equity brought by the United States.'"
Since its inception, the FTC has suffered from the weakness of its
---. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).

Whether a practice is "unfair" is ultimately a

legal question, and while reviewing courts ordinarily show deference to the Commis-

sion's conclusions, the statutory standard must "get [its]
final meaning from judicial
construction." FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
6.

7.

15 U.S.C. § 46(l) (1970).

FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).

8.
9.
10.

15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1970).
52 Stat. 111 (1938).

11.

Such a situation exists, for example, when allthe members of a given industry

are engaging in a deceptive practice, such as mislabeling, which only misleads the
ultimate consumer.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
Banks, common carriers subject to other federal
regulation, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, and persons subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 are also
exempt from the Commission's enforcement powers in Section 5 of the FTCA. See

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 47 (1970).
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enabling statute. Respondents whose practices are challenged by the
FTC are under no obligation to modify them until the Commission has
issued a cease and desist order which has become final. In practice,
this means that while the FTC is investigating the alleged unfair practice, taking testimony and evidence before a hearing examiner and deliberating on the propriety of issuing a cease and desist order, the
challenged practice, however unfair, often continues unabated. A
further delay in the enforceability of a cease and desist order often occurs when the recipient of the order successfully petitions the approp14
riate court of appeals for review as provided by the statute.
Although the FTC was intended to substitute a speedy administrative hearing for the slow, tiresome process of the federal courts, the
case-by-case adjudication mandated by the Act has tended to enmesh
the FTC in extensive and interminable litigation. 15 These protracted
proceedings, instead of clarifying the statutory standard of unfairness,
have often increased its uncertainty. 16
By confining the FTC's remedial powers to the issuance of cease and
desist orders, the framers of the FTCA made it difficult for the Commission to deal with "deceptive acts or practices" which often can only
be curbed by punitive sanctions or the power to order affirmative disclosures.'" Perhaps this limitation of remedial powers arose out of
the framers' assumption that the agency they were creating would deal
primarily with unfair methods of competition, such as agreements in
restraint of trade, which may be effectively terminated merely by a
cease and desist order.
In an apparent attempt to overcome these statutory weaknesses, the
FTC announced in 196218 that thenceforth, at its discretion, it would
promulgate rules and regulations for use in reaching decisions in subsequent proceedings before the agency bearing on particular unfair
practices. 9 Although the original announcement merely stated that
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b)-(c) (1970).
15. See Note, The Federal Trade Commission and Reform of the Administrative
Process, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 692-93 (1962); A.B.A., REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 10, 28-32 (1969).
16. A.B.A., REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 11 (1969); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,48 MINN. L. REV. 383, 445-49, 464-65, 518-19 (1964).
17. Under the rubric of "cease and desist" the FTC has ordered such affirmative
actions as disclosure of consumer information and corrective advertising. For a general discussion and an attempt to determine the limits of this approach, see Lemke,
Souped Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the FTC, 4 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORm
180 (1970).
18. 27 Fed. Reg. 4636, 4796 (1962).
19. The Commission's current Rules of Practice provide:
Trade regulation rules.-(a) Nature and authority.-For the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of the statutes administered by it, the Commission

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 107

the Commission would be able to "rely" upon these "trade regulation rules" in the adjudicative proceedings which precede the issuance
of a cease and desist order, the FTC's 1962 Annual Report more
firmly stated:
It would not be necessary to present evidence that the practice itself was violative of law since2 0 the respondent could not challenge
the validity of the rule as such.

Although there was some subsequent wavering from the firm position
taken in the 1962 Annual Report, 2 ' it still is an accurate statement
of how the Commission intends to use these rules.22
Assuming that such trade regulation rules are to be formulated in
compliance with the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 the procedural effect of these rules on agency determina-

tions is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen from the figure, the primary effect of trade regulation rules is to shift the time for challenges
to the FTC position from the agency enforcement process which follows a complaint to the rule-making process which precedes the filing
of a complaint.
Not fully illustrated by Figure 1 is the time the Commission hopes
to save by a single determination by rule-making that a practice is unfair in a given industry or trade instead of establishing this fact over
and over again in separate adjudicative proceedings against individual
members of the industry or trade. Thus, rule-making can act as a kind
of super "class action" against all potential or existing users of a given

practice.
is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations applicable to unlawful trade
practices. Such rules and regulations (hereinafter called "trade regulation
rules") express the experience and judgment of the Commission, based on facts
of which it has knowledge derived from studies, reports, investigations, hearings, and other proceedings, or within official notice, concerning the substantive requirements of the statutes which it administers.
(b) Scope.-Trade regulation rules may cover all applications of a particular statutory provision and may be nationwide in effect, or they may be limited to particular areas or industries or to particular product or geographic
markets, as may be appropriate.
(c) Use of 'rules in adjudicative proceedings.-Where a trade regulation
rule is relevant to any issue involved in an adjudicative proceeding thereafter
instituted, the Commission may rely upon the rule to resolve such issue, provided that the respondent shall have been given a fair hearing on the applicability of the rule to the particular case.
16 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1973).
20. FTC, 1962 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 36 (1962).
21. The then chairman of the FTC, Mr. Paul Rand Dixon, indicated after 1962 that
such binding rule-making authority did not exist for the FTC. Hearings on H.R.
15440 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 990 (1966).

22.

See the position taken by the Commission in National Petroleum Refiners

Association v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed infra.
23. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as APA].

making provisions are found at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).

The rule-
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The Commission's promulgation of trade regulation rules can also
be thought of as an attempt to replace the highly formalized proceedings which occur during agency adjudication with the less formal
process of rule-making. In terms of the APA, this action represents
a shift from Sections 5 and 7,24 which apply to adjudicative hearings and
permit respondents to present oral evidence and conduct cross-examinations, to Section 4,25 which applies to rule-making proceedings
and grants respondents a more limited right to make written submissions without an opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses.
The FTC claims to derive its rule-making authority from Section
6(g) of the FTCA, which clearly states:
[T]he commission shall also have power . . . to make rules and
regulations for
the purpose of carrying out the provisions . . .
26
of this [Act].
Although this provision does not explicitly state that the FTC may
define the statutory standard of unfairness by means of rule-making
for particular practices, the Commission is encouraged by recent
statements by members of the Supreme Court that for an agency with
both rule-making and adjudicative powers, which is about to impose a
new far-reaching standard of conduct that is not particularized to special
facts, rule-making is the preferred procedure. This is because of the
APA's provisions for advance notice and broad public participation in
the rule-making process.2 7 One appellate court has even gone so far as
to require rule-making.2"
The Commission is further encouraged to issue trade regulation
rules under its general rule-making powers in Section 6(g) by the Supreme Court's treatment of a similarly worded statute empowering the
Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of the Truth-in-Lending Act.2 9 Writing for the Court, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger stated:
24.

5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1970).

Section 7(c) of the APA provides in part:

A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as
may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Section 4(c) of the APA provides in part:
mhe agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with
or without opportunity for oral presentation.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970).
27. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969). Also, see the
dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas, id. at 777, and Harlan, id. at 781.
28. Bell Aerospace Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).

The court refused to enforce a Board adjudication in part because it made the kind
of significant change in the Board's definition of protected workers that should only
have been promulgated by rule-making.
29.

112

Truth-in-Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
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Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that
the agency may "make . . . such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act," we have
held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will
be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of
the enabling legislation ... ."30

But from its beginnings in 1914 until 1962, almost half a century, the
FTC maintained that it lacked the kind of rule-making power it has
claimed since 1962. The legislative history of the FTCA reveals
that there were those who supported giving the Commission its present
powers while also believing that they did not include the power to
draw up a list of unfair practices."'
During its early years, the FTC would convene industry conferences to draft "guidelines" defining fair trade practices. While industry members were expected to comply with the guidelines, they
did not have the legal conclusiveness which the agency now asserts for
the trade regulation rules; did not necessarily rest on the solid evidentiary basis which is established for each trade regulation rule by means
of the rule-making process; and were merely advisory as to the type
of practice the Commission might move against.3 2 A bill was introduced by Senator Nye of South Dakota in 1932 to give these guide33
lines the force of law, but Congress took no action upon it.
Because of the belief that, in spite of the clear language of Section
6 (g) of the FTCA, the Commission lacked the power to make binding
rules defining unfair practices, Congress passed statutes in certain
discrete areas, dealing mostly with labeling and packaging, to authorize
the FTC to issue binding rules. Each of these statutes specified that,
in the particular area covered by the statute, acts which violate the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall constitute an "unfair method
of competition" or "deceptive practice" within the meaning of the
30.

Mourning v. Family Publications Service Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).

31.

During the debates which preceded passage of the FTCA in the Senate, Senator

Cummins, a leading member of the Senate Commerce Committee and a proponent
of the measure, stated:
Why . . . if I thought the commission which we hope to create would sit

down and attempt to write out an instruction to the businessmen of this country as to the things they could lawfully do and the things which it would be
unlawful for them to do, there is no power that could induce me to favor it.

51 CONG. REc. 12917 (1914).

32. FTC, TRADE PRACTICE SUBMrITALS 22 (1925). These guidelines survive today
as the FTC's "trade practice rules," which have been described by a leading authority
as "numerous and extensive" but of "appalling" emptiness.

K.

DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE

TEXT, § 6.07, at 151 (3d ed. 1972). Today the FTC issues "industry guides"
which it hopes will be adopted voluntarily. A period of about one year is allowed
LAW

to elapse before the Commission begins to enforce the guides by adjudicative proceedings before the Commission. FTC, Procedure for Effecting Industrywide Compliance
with Specific Industry Guides, Release (December.16, 1969).

33.

S.2628, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); 75 CoNG. REc. 1287 (1932).

Vol. 5: 107

Loyola University Law Journal

FTCA.3 4
Commentators from outside the FTC have been highly critical
of the Commission's assertion that it has the power to promulgate
trade regulation rules. Typical of this criticism are the conclusions
of Professors Burrus and Teter of Georgetown Law School:
In the face of legislative history and the individualized grants of
rulemaking authority in specific instances, the imputation of a
congressional intent to grant rulemaking authority strains the
imagination. s5
Figure 2
Rule Tree
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Judicial
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JudtiMal

Administrative
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34. Wool Products Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 68a (1970); Fur Products Labeling
Act of 1951, 15 U.S.C. §§ 69a (a)-(c), 69f (b) (1970); Flammable Fabrics Act of
1953 as amended in 1967, 15 U.S.C. § 1194(c) (1970); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 70a (a)-(c) (1970); Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act of 1967, 15 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (1970).
35. Burrus and Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEo.

114
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But the language of Section 6(g) clearly empowers the Commission
to make some kinds of rules. In order to discuss what kinds of rulemaking powers the FTC may have, use is made of the "Rule Tree"
shown in Figure 2, which represents an attempt to classify and differentiate rules in a useful manner.
In constructing the Rule Tree of Figure 2, it is assumed that the
rules are formulated by the chiefs of an administrative agency. It is
also assumed that the enforcement hierarchy consists of agency personnel, agency chiefs (who may sit as an administrative tribunal), and
courts of review. Rules can be either procedural or substantive. Procedural rules determine the mode and formalities of agency actions
and communications, whether carried on within the agency or with
persons outside the agency. Procedural rules must be followed by
the agency itself and by those who have a duty to, or choose to, deal
with it. Substantive rules define with more particularity the rights and
duties granted or imposed by the statutes enforced by the agency."8
We next consider which public officials have a duty to enforce
a rule without modifying it; this leads to a further division of rules
into interpretive rules, intra-agency rules, and lawlike rules. Interpretive rules are enforced without modification by agency personnel. Both
agency chiefs, who promulgate interpretive rules, and courts of review
can modify interpretive rules by making discretionary changes in
them during their application. Intra-agency rules are enforced without
modification by agency personnel and agency chiefs, but courts of review retain discretion to modify these rules during application. Intraagency rules are formulated by agency chiefs, but these same agency
chiefs are bound by these rules until they modify them by a rule-making
process.
L.J. 1106, 1125 (1966). Also see, Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 490 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV.
921, 960 (1965); Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission:
Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 570 (1964).
For an analysis which

finds the legislative history ambiguous and which endorses the FTC claim to rule-

making powers, see, Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORN.
L.Q. 678, 742-46 (1966).
Two student analyses which conclude that the FTC's
rule-making assertions are excessive are, Comment, The FTC's Claim of Substantive
Rule-Making Power: A Study in Opposition, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 330 (1972),
and Note, National Petroleum Refiners Association v. Federal Trade Commission:
Authority of FTC to Promulgate Trade Regulation Rules, 18 S. DAY. L. REV. 243
(1973).

36. The distinction between a procedural and a substantive rule is easier to illustrate with selected rules than to determine for every rule. There is, in fact, no
guarantee that these two classes are mutually exclusive or that rules "stay put" in

one class or the other over the course of time. Yet to the extent that there is
a working consensus at any one time and place as to what kinds of rules belong
in each class, the distinction is a useful one.

Figure 3
Rule Definitions and Examples for Figure 2
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1. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
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28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970)
2. ICC Rate-setting
Pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1970)
1. Federal Court Rules
Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970)
2. Miranda Warnings
384 U.S. 436 (1966)
1. Patent Office
Rules of Practice
Pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 6 (1970)
2. Emancipation
Proclamation (1863)
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Lawlike rules are enforced without modification by agency personnel,
agency chiefs and courts of review. The agency chiefs, who formulate
lawlike rules, modify them by a rule-making process. Such rules are
"lawlike" because at each stage of enforcement, those who apply a
lawlike rule treat it like a legislative act of Congress. For this reason, lawlike rules are often referred to as legislative rules, but this
term has been reserved for a subclass of lawlike rules. Lawlike rules
are often challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional
power to legislate. The rationale used to sustain a given lawlike rule
becomes a means of distinguishing lawlike rules as legislative, judicial
or administrative. Legislative lawlike rules are those made pursuant to
a valid delegation of Congressional legislative power. Often this exercise of delegated legislative power is justified as a filling-in of the statute with details best left to the enforcement agency. Judicial lawlike
rules are those made by courts, either because of their constitutional
or inherent powers or pursuant to legislative grants for the purpose
of conducting judicial business. Administrative rules are made by
public officials, either because of their constitutional or inherent powers or pursuant to legislative grants for the purpose of conducting
business best determined by such officials. Figure 3 summarizes the
rule definitions given above and gives examples of each type of rule.
A discussion of the kinds of rule-making powers the Commission
was granted by Section 6(g) of the FTCA is now possible. There is
little dispute that Section 6(g) gives the Commission the power to
promulgate lawlike procedural rules for the administration of the adjudications called for in Section 5(b) of the FTCA as a means of issuing
cease and desist orders against unfair practices. This power has been
upheld by the courts.3 7
This suggests that the Commission's decision to determine that
certain practices are "unfair" prior to adjudication by means of rulemaking is itself a Section 6(g) lawlike procedural rule (see Figure 2)
and, therefore, can only be overruled by reviewing courts if it violates
the existing procedural provisions of the FTCA, such as that providing
for the adjudicative hearing set forth in Section 5 (b) .1
37.

The Commission may issue rules specifying in greater detail than does the

statute the mode of serving process, requirements as to the filing of answers, and

other litigation details. Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803, 810
(9th Cir. 1960); United States v. San Juan Lumber Co., 313 F. Supp. 703, 708 (D.
Colo. 1969).

38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). The section provides that
[w]henever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of

117
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The trade regulation rules so formulated would then be substantive
rules in that they would spell out the statutory prohibition against un-

fair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
greater detail. These substantive rules would appear to fall within
the rulings stating that while the FTC's conclusions as to the standard
to be applied are ordinarily shown deference,3 9 the standard must get

its final meaning from judicial construction.4"

Referring again to Fig-

ure 2, trade regulation rules would then appear to be intra-agency substantive rules. It is these novel intra-agency substantive rules which
may be beyond the rule-making powers granted to the Commission by
Section 6(g). A review of the history of the Commission's assertion

of this rule-making power since 1962 follows.
competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, and if it shall
appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be
to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and
containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at
least thirty days after the service of said complaint. The person, partnership,
or corporation so complained of shall have the right to appear at the place
therein fixed at least thirty days after the service of said complaint. The
person, partnership, or corporation so complained of shall have the right to
appear at the place and time so fixed and show cause why an order should
not be entered by the Commission requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from the violation of the law so charged in said
complaint. Any person, partnership, or corporation may make application,
and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the Commission to intervene
and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person. The testimony in
any such proceeding shall be reduced to writing and filed in the office of
the Commission. If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion
that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title, it shall make a report
in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person, partnership, or corporation an order
requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such such method of competition or such act or practice. Until the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, or, if a petition for review has
been filed within such time then until the record in the proceeding has been
filed in a court of appeals of the United States, as hereinafter provided, the
Commission may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as it shall
deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or any order made or issued by it under this section. After the expiration of the time
allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed
within such time, the Commission may at any time, after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part,
any report or order made or issued by it under this section, whenever in the
opinion of the Commission conditions of fact or of law have so changed as
to require such action or if the public interest shall so require: Provided,
however, That the said person, partnership, or corporation may, within sixty
days after service upon him or it of said report or order entered after such
a reopening, obtain a review thereof in the appropriate court of appeals of
the United States, in the manner provided in subsection (c) of this section.
39. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953);
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720-21 (1948); FTC v. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,
291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).
40. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
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Figure 441 shows trade regulation rules now in force with a listing of
the year in which each rule became effective. Additional rules are awaiting the assignment of an effective date,42 or have not gone beyond the
proposal stage.4 3 It seems fair to characterize these rules as consumer-oriented and as dealing mostly with unfair or deceptive prac-

tices, as opposed to unfair methods of competition.

Between 1962

and 1972 the FTC promulgated only about two trade regulation rules
per year.
In two early court cases, challenges to the FTC's power to issue
41.

Figure 4
Trade Regulation Rules

Effective 16 C.F.R. §
Since
(1973)
Title
Advertising and labeling as to size of sleeping bags.
1963
400
1966
401
Misuse of "automatic" or terms of similar import as descriptive of
household electric sewing machines.
1964
402
Deception as to nonprismatic and partially prismatic instruments
being prismatic binoculars.
1965
403
Deceptive use of "leakproof," "guaranteed leakproof," etc., as
descriptive of dry cell batteries.
1965
404
Deceptive advertising and labeling as to size of tablecloths and
related products.
1965
405
Misbranding and deception as to leather content of waist belts.
1965
406
Deceptive advertising and labeling of previously used lubricating
oil.
Cancelled 408
Unfair or deceptive advertising and labeling of cigarettes in relation to the health hazards of smoking.
1971
409
Incandescent lamp (light bulb) industry.
1971
410
Deceptive advertising as to sizes of viewable pictures shown by
television receiving sets.
1968
412
Discriminatory practices in men's and boys' tailored clothing industry.
1968
413
Failure to disclose that skin irritation may result from washing
or handling glass fiber curtains and draperies and glass fiber
curtain and drapery fabrics.
1968
414
Deception as to transistor count of radio receiving sets, including
transceivers.
1969
417
Failure to disclose the lethal effects of inhaling quick-freeze aerosol spray products used for frosting cocktail glasses.
1970
418
Deceptive advertising and labeling as to length of extension ladders.
1969
419
Games of chance in the food retailing and gasoline industries.
1972
422
Failure to post minimum research octaine ratings on gasoline
dispensing pumps constitutes an unfair trade practice and an
unfair method of competition.
1972
423
Care labeling of textile wearing apparel.
1971
424
Retail and store advertising and marketing practices.
The cigarette rule, 16 C.F.R. § 408, was superseded by an act of Congress, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 et seq. (1970).
42. Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1973); Use of
Negative Option Plans by Sellers in Commerce, 38 Fed. Reg. 4896 (1973).
43. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 36 Fed. Reg.
21607, 22187 (1971); Preservation of Consumer's Claims and Defenses, 38 Fed. Reg.
892 (1973).
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trade regulation rules were rejected by the court because they were
premature, since the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the rule-making procedure which precedes promulgation of a rule." In Bristol-Myers Co.
v. FTC,4 5 District Court Judge Holtzoff offered the following rationale
for his court's refusal to consider issuing an injunction during the rulemaking process:
It is a well established rule of law that the courts will not interfere
with administrative proceedings while they are pending. As a
matter of fact, no one can tell today what type of rule, if any,
will eventually be adopted by the Commission. When one is
adopted, if it46 is adopted at all, will be the proper time to seek
court review.
The issue of the FTC's authority to promulgate substantive intraagency rules was properly raised, however, in a later suit brought by
47
two trade associations and thirty-four gasoline refining companies
after the Commission had set an effective date for a trade regulation
48
rule requiring the posting of octane numbers on gasoline pumps.
44. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 1968 Trade Cas. 72,496 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd and
aff'd in part, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lever Brothers v. FTC, 325 F. Supp.
371 (D. Me. 1971).
45. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 1968 Trade Cas. 72,496, at 85,678 (D.D.C. 1968).
46. Id.
47. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972).
48. The rule provides:
In connection with the sale or consignment of motor gasoline for general
automotive use, in commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, it constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive act or practice for refiners or others who sell to retailers,
when such refiners or other distributors own or lease the pumps through
which motor gasoline is dispensed to the consuming public, to fail to disclose
clearly and conspicuously in a permanent manner on the pumps the minimum
octane number or numbers of the motor gasoline being dispense. In the
case of those refiners or other distributors who lease pumps, the disclosure required by this section should be made as soon as it is legally practical; for
example, not later than the end of the current lease period. Nothing in this
section should be construed as applying to gasoline sold for aviation purposes.
NOTE: For the purposes of this section, "octane number" shall mean the octane number derived from the sum of research (R) and motor (M) octane
numbers divided by 2; (R + M)/2. The research octane (R) and motor octane number (M) shall be as described in the American Society for Testing
and Materials (ASTM) "Standard Specifications for Gasoline" D 439-70, and
subsequent revisions, and ASTM Test Methods D 2699 and D 2700.
36 FED. REG. 23871 (1971).
Interestingly, similar provisions have been put into
effect under the Phase IV Economic Stabilization Program:
Posting.-No later than 11:59 p.m., local time, September 7, 1973, each
refiner-retailer, or retailer of gasoline, or No. 2-D diesel fuel shall post the
ceiling price in a prominent place on each pump used to dispense retail
sales of gasoline or No. 2-D diesel fuel and the octane number for that gasoline. The ceiling price and octane number must be certified and posted in
the form and manner prescribed by the Cost of Living Council.
38 Fed. Reg. 23794 (1973), CCH Stabilization Program Guidelines 46,355, § 150.355

(e) (1973).

The Stabilization Program Guidelines also make clear that by octane number the
guidelines mean minimum octane number:
"Octane number" means the octane number derived from the sum of Research
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Jurisdiction for judical review of the agency's action in this case,
National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC,4 9 was founded on Section 10
of the APA," and the following grounds were offered for the complaint:
(1) the Commission lacked statutory authority to promulgate
the rule;
(2) the rule was an unconstitutional usurpation of Congressional
legislative power;
(3) the FTC's rule-making procedures denied future respondents
the hearing guaranteed by Section 5(b) of the FTCA, the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, and the APA;
(4) the octane number posting rule lacked factual support;
(5) promulgation of the rule was arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
the issue raised in ground (1) of the complaint, holding that "the
statute (FTCA) does not confer upon the Federal Trade Commission
the authority to promulgate Trade Regulation Rules that have the effect of substantive law."51 In reaching its decision, the district court
stressed three grounds. First, it found that the failure of the FTC to
assert its claimed rule-making authority for almost fifty years indicated
that the agency always knew that it was not granted such powers. Second, having reviewed the FTCA's legislative history, the court found
that Section 6(g) was only intended to authorize "internal rules of or(R) and Motor (M) octane numbers divided by two; (R + M)/2. The research octane (R) and motor octane number (M) shall be as described in the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) "Standard Specifications for Gasoline" D 439-70 and subsequent revisions, and ASTM Test Methods D 2699 and D 2700. When gasoline of different octane numbers is
mixed for sale, "octane number" means the lowest octane number of the gasoline used in this mixture.
38 Fed. Reg. 22536 (1973), CCH Stabilization Program Guidelines
46,352, §
150.352 (1973).
It took the FTC almost three years to promulgate its proposed octane number
rule: Announcement of Intended Rule (7/30/69); Original Rule Issued (but not yet
effective) (12/30/70); Effective date of Original Rule (cancelled) (4/12/71); Revised Rule Issued (but not yet effective) (12/9/71); Effective Date of Revised Rule
(stayed by district court) (3/15/72); Finally effective (stay vacated) (11/15/73).
49. 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq. (1970). Section 10(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1970), provides that:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Section 10(e) 2(C) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), requires the reviewing court
to "hold unlawful and set aside agency actions . . . in excess of statutory authority.
5"1. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (D.D.C.
1972).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 107

ganization, practice, and procedure."5 2 Third, the court inferred from
Congress' later grants of substantive rule-making to the FTC for use
only in certain narrow areas, such as textile and wool products labeling,
that the legislative branch did not intend Section 6(g) to be a general
grant of substantive rule-making power.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and
the case was remanded for treatment of the other issues raised in the
complaint.13 In response to the reasoning of the court below, the circuit court, in an opinion written by Judge Wright, held first, that the
FTC's failure to make earlier use of its rule-making power was due to
an "unduly crabbed and cautious analysis"54 of the statute's legislative
background. Second, it held that the legislative history was too ambiguous to sustain an inference of specific Congressional intent to limit
the scope of the FTC's rule-making power. Finally, the court reasoned that where there is solid evidence that Congress has enacted
remedial legislation out of caution and to eliminate statutory ambiguity, it is not proper to view these actions as a de facto ratification of
the narrow application of Section 6(g) rule-making powers. The court
felt that the "plain language of Section 6(g),"5 5 if narrowly construed,
would "render the Commission ineffective to do the job assigned to it
by Congress.!"
The circuit court tempered its recognition of substantive rule-making
power in two respects. First, a defendant in a Section 5 proceeding
must be given some opportunity to show that the special circumstances
of his case warrant a waiver of any trade regulation rule relied upon by
the Commission.56 '1 Second, it was pointed out that since the statutory
standard which a substantive rule attempts to define with greater specificity is a legal standard, the rule is subject to full judicial review.5 7
The circuit court based its decision, in part, on the construction which
other courts had given to provisions similar to Section 6(g) in the authorizing statutes of other administrative agencies.5 8 Thus, National
52.
53.
1973),
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1345.
National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir.
Petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1973) (No. 806).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 697.
Id.

56.1. Id. at 692.
57. Id. at 693.
58. Although called upon to review a determination as to whether Section 6(g)
gives the FTC any substantive rule-making power at all, the court mostly confined

its search for precedents to previous cases where an agency's statute was assumed
to grant some substantive rule-making power and the issue to be resolved was the
scope of that power.
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Broadcasting Co. v. United States"9 was cited because it dealt with
the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) power to impose
certain rules under two then-existing statutory provisions which stated:
The [FCC] from time to time, as the public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires, shall(i) Have authority to make special regulations applicable to
radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting;
(r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.60
In National Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's
power to issue substantive rules regulating contractual relationships
between networks and affiliates. 0 '
The court in National Petroleum also relied upon Morgan Stanley &
Co. v. SEC6 2 and American Trucking Assoc. v. United States63 as authority for its decision. In Morgan Stanley, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC's) power under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act 4 to formulate substantive rules regulating the financial practices and
securities transactions of holding companies controlling electric and gas
utilities was found to include regulation of underwriters' commissions
in public utility offerings, while in American Trucking the scope of
the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC's) substantive rule-making authority under the Motor Carrier Act 5 was found to extend to
regulation of the use of leased equipment by authorized carriers.
The most recent case relied upon to justify a liberal interpretation
of rule-making grants was Mourning v. Family PublicationsService Inc.66
It was not disputed in Mourning that Section 121 of the Truth-in-Lending
Act 6" stated only that the Act's disclosures6" were required of merchants
who charged for extending credit. But the Supreme Court upheld a
59. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1938).
61. In National Broadcasting it was not disputed that the statutory provisions
had, at the very least, given the FCC the power to issue substantive rules determining
engineering and technical aspects of radio communication. National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943). Therefore, the Supreme Court's
decision appears merely to be a refusal to restrict the FCC's substantive rule-making
power to scientific and technical matters. Id. at 215-16.
62. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1942).
63. American Trucking Assoc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
65. 49 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970).
66. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1970).
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Federal Reserve Board Rule, 9 promulgated under the general rulemaking provision of the Truth-in-Lending Act, Section 105,0 that went
beyond the statutory provision and required merchants who did not
charge for credit to make similar disclosures if they arranged for repayment in more than four installments. 71 Thus, the Court reasoned that
since other regulatory agencies' powers to issue substantive rules have not
only been sustained but liberally construed, and since the rule-making
provision of each of these agencies' enabling statutes is phrased in
language almost identical to Section 6(g) of the FTC statute, the FTC
also has extensive substantive rule-making power.
In order to reach its decision in National Petroleum it was also necessary for the court to respond to arguments that the use of substantive
rule-making to determine unfair practices is inconsistent with the provision for individual administrative adjudications in Section 5(b) of the
FTCA. Its reply to this contention was that recent Supreme Court
and federal cases show an "obvious judicial willingness to permit sub7' 2
stantive rule-making to undercut the primacy of adjudication.
In support of this conclusion, the circuit court cited United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co.73 and Federal Power Commission v. Texaco,
Inc.,74 cases in which it was held that where an agency has substantive rule-making powers, it need not grant a license application
hearing to an applicant who is not in compliance with the agency's
rules unless the applicant sets forth reasons in his application which, if
69. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1973).
70. The rule-making provision stated:
The [Federal Reserve] Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of [the Act]. These regulations may contain such classifications, dif-

ferentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and
exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board
are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of [the Act], to prevent

circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).

71.

In view of the Truth-in-Lending Act's legislative history, which showed that

Congress was well aware that merchants who extended installment credit "without
interest" were likely to be concealing finance charges in the principal to be repaid,

and the statutory provision authorizing rule-making to "prevent circumvention" of
the Act, it could be argued that it did not require an especially liberal interpretation
to uphold the rule. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
367 n.27 (1973).
72. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Is this judicial willingness to undercut adjudication consistent with the circuit court's
own view of its role in construing statutes?
Our duty here is not simply to make a policy judgment as to what mode of
procedure best accommodates the need for effective enforcement. . . . The
extent of the FTC's powers can be decided only by considering the powers
Congress specifically granted it in the light of the statutory language and

background.
Id. at 674.
73. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
74. 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
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true, would justify a change or waiver of the rules."5
Additional authority for undercutting adjudication was found in
a series of cases involving the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),"
the FCC, 77 and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) 78 wherein licensees were denied individual adjudicatory hearings when a federal
licensing agency made changes in their license privileges by rule,
even though individual adjudications were apparently required by each
agency's statute. But opponents of substantive rule-making power for
the FTC have argued that decisions dealing with the ICC, FCC, FAA,
FPC, and CAB are irrelevant to the FTC. The FTC, it is argued, is
best characterized as a prosecuting agency rather than as a regulatory
agency; therefore, since the FTC does not exercise pervasive licensegranting, rate-setting, or clearance functions, the courts should be less
eager to infer that a general grant of rule-making authority was meant
to include the power to make substantive rules.
In reply to this argument that the FTC be considered sui generis,
the circuit court noted that the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), whose method of adjudication and enforcement is very similar to that of the FTC, undoubtedly has the authority to issue substantive rules. 79 "Given the expanse of the Commission's power to
define proper business practices," said the court, "we believe it is but a
quibble to differentiate between the potential pervasiveness of the FTC's
power and that of other agencies on the basis of its prosecutorial and
adjudicatory mode of proceeding." 80
75. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
76. American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (en banc).
77. California Citizens Band Assoc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967);
WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
914 (1968).
78. Air Lines Pilots Assoc., International v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
79. The NLRB's power to make iules is granted by Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970), which provides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act. (Emphasis added).
The language emphasized above was added by the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947. This additional language removed any doubt whether the NLRB had substantive rule-making power because the rule-making provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970), does not apply "to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970). To
date Congress has failed to similarly amend Section 6(g) of the FTCA.
80. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 685 (1973).
This
appears to be inconsistent with the following language found elsewhere in the opinion:
The rules the FTC proposes to issue are not ICC type orders operating immediately on a designated class of parties at alL They are merely norms which
in the absence of agency brought proceedings to enforce them have no legal
effect whatever. . . . This is not even a case where the rule alone is de-
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Although the Commission's substantive rule-making powers have been
sustained by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, the
FTC's rule-making authority will continue to be uncertain without a
definitive ruling by the Supreme Court should National Petroleum
Refiners Association's petition for certiorari be granted. Future challenges to trade regulation rules need not be brought within the District
of Columbia, however. Each time the Commission issues a cease and
desist order based on a trade regulation rule, it will create an opportunity
for the respondent, under Section 5(c) of the FTCA,8 ' to obtain review
of the FTC's legal conclusions "within any circuit where the . . . practice in question was used or where [the respondent] resides or carries on
business . . . ." Thus, other circuits will have an opportunity to rule
on whether the issuance of trade regulation rules exceeds the Commission's statutory authority.
It seems particularly likely that if the Commission begins to formulate trade regulation rules in the area of competition,82 the circuit courts
of appeal would be bound to consider whether National Petroleum,
which dealt with consumer protection, adequately analyzed whether
the 63d Congress meant to enforce the antitrust laws by rule-making.
After all, it is one thing to leave to the FTC the modest task of drafting
labeling rules for shirts or gasoline, and quite another to entrust it with
the power to promulgate a national code of competition.8
Even before the favorable reversal in National Petroleum, FTC
Chairman Lewis A. Engman appeared before a House Subcommittee
which was considering legislation to clarify the FTC's substantive rulemaking powers and stated:
At this point . . . the Commission would oppose any statutory
rulemaking provision affording less flexibility than we believe we
now have under the law. The Commission clearly recognizes
terminative of a business' rights without more, as [the FCC rules] in United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
82. For an example of Supreme Court approval of the use of rule-making as a

means for controlling a tendency towards monopoly in a particular industry, see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) and United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). In National Broadcasting the FCC
was permitted to enforce a rule forbidding certain types of provisions in chain broad-

casting contracts, while in Storer the FCC's rule setting a limit on the number of stations that could be owned by one licensee was upheld.
83. Consider the following assessment made by the President's Advisory Council
Executive Organization:
Even though more policy formulation through informal rulemaking is needed,
antitrust matters are often appropriately dealt with on a case-by-case basis
while consumer protection problems are more readily amenable to resolution
by rules and regulations.
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the need to achieve a balance between procedural efficiency and
procedural safeguards. We believe . . .that judicial affirmation
of the Commission's rulemaking authority will give us the flexibility to develop procedures which strike this essential balance.
For these reasons we have reached the conclusion that we
should await the imminent court decision [in the Circuit Court of
Appeals] and seek additional legislative authority only if that decision is unfavorable. Such a course will not jeopardize Commission rulemaking, and, in the meantime, American consumers can
begin to reap the benefits associated with prompt enactment of
the less controversial
amendments provided in the legislation be84
fore this committee.
The Subcommittee was considering passage of H.R. 20, Section 203
of which provided:
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

Sec.203. Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
U.S.C. § 46(g)) is amended to read as follows:
"(g) (1) From time to time to classify corporations and to issue (A) procedural rules, and (B) rules defining with specificity
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive to consumers and
which are within the scope of section 5(a)(1) of [the FTC] Act.
"(g)(2)(C) When any rule [of paragraph (g)(1)(B)] is
promulgated and becomes final a subsequent violation thereof
shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in viola'8 5
tion of section 5(a)(1) of [the FTC] Act."
Because the substantive rule-making grant in H.R. 20 was limited
to "acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive to consumers," it
would not apply to the "unfair methods of competition"8 6 which are
also banned by the FTCA. Thus, H.R. 20 actually would have the effect of diminishing the Commission's claimed rule-making powers.
When the court of appeals announced its National Petroleum decision upholding the FTC's substantive rule-making power on June 27,
1973, an elated William Dixon, Director of the FTC's Division of
Rules and Guides (a part of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection),
confidently predicted that the Commission would soon be clearing up
the rule-making backlog which had developed while the district
8 7
court's adverse decision eclipsed the FTC's ability to make rules.
84. Statement by Lewis A. Engman, Chairman of the FTC, Hearings on Consumer
Warranty Protection Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House
Committee on interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1973).
85. H.R. 20, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1973).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
87. Court of Appeals Decision in Octane Case Paves Way for Action on Wide
Range of FTC Rules, No. 621 ATRR, A-5 (July 10, 1973).
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Two weeks later the FTC abolished the Division of Rules and Guides
and made William Dixon a Commission hearing officer. The announcement of this reorganization was made by Chairman Engman, who
said:
Since rulemaking is so essential to the work of the entire Bureau
[of Consumer Protection], the separate division which has handled it exclusively has been eliminated and instead the various
operating devisions will be responsible for developing rules. This
will give all Bureau attorneys the option to proceed either by
rulemaking or litigation in the areas where they have developed
substantive expertise.88
Chairman Engman did not state whether this diffusion of "essential"
rule-making power was meant to reach the antitrust enforcement attorneys in the FTC's Bureau of Competition, but on other occasions he
has publicly taken the position that future budget allocations and manpower assignments must reflect a greater emphasis on competitive
89
antitrust activities within the Commission.
Congress' acceptance of the FTC's decision to retain broad substantive rule-making powers by relying on favorable judicial construction
of Section 6(g) instead of asking for a legislative clarification was revealed when, on September 12, 1973, the Senate passed S. 356, the
"Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act." Conspicuously absent from S. 356 was the provision, present
in earlier versions of the bill which had passed the Senate, which authorized the FTC to define with specificity those acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive to consumers and in violation of Section 5(a)(1) of
the FTCA.9 0 Thus, for some time to come the construction given
Section 6(g) of the FTCA in National Petroleum will be the Commission's sole and preferred authority for issuing trade regulation rules.
Turning to the merits of the National Petroleum decision, it has already been noted that the court of appeals found that a lack of substantive rule-making power "would render the Commission ineffective
to do the job assigned to it by Congress." 9' 1 In view of the Commission's active regulatory role for more than half a century without this
power, such a characterization of the need for substantive rule-making
88.

FTC Abolishes Rulemaking Division, Announces Other Changes in Bureau of

Consumer Protection,No. 622 ATRR, A-16 (July 17, 1973).
89.
90.

Interview with Lewis A. Engman, No. 633 ATRR, AA-2 (October 9, 1973).
Senate Passes Bill to Beef Up FTC Powers, Set Warranty Standards, No. 630

ATRR, A-2 (September 18, 1973). For an earlier version of S. 356 with rule-making
provisions, see S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). S. 986 was passed by the Senate,
76-2, in 1971. 117 CONG. REC. S17887 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
91. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 697 (1973).
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would appear to be extreme. Moreover, critics of the FTC have been
more prone to place the blame for the agency's failures on mismanagement of its existing resources rather than on a lack of rule-making authority:
Through an inadequate system of recruitment and promotion, [the
FTC] has acquired and elevated to important positions a number
of staff members of insufficient competence. The failure of the
FTC to establish and adhere to a system of priorities has caused a
misallocation of funds and personnel to trivial matters rather than
to matters of pressing public concern.
[T]he agency must recognize that some of its most serious problems-such as excessive delays and conflict at the Commissioner
level between the functions of prosecutor and judge-can be solved
by greater delegation of authority to the staff . . . . [T]he Commission [should] confer on its bureau directors the authority to
issue complaints and close investigations, on its General Counsel
the authority to seek preliminary injunctions, and on its projected
consumer protection task forces the authority to initiate and close
act as operating
investigations, issue complaints, and otherwise
92
bureaus with respect to its own programs.
It has also been suggested that the Commission undercuts the authority of its advisory opinions, industry guidelines, trade practice rules,
and cease and desist orders by requiring compliance reports which it
does not and cannot verify because of the small staff assigned to the
Bureau of Industry Guidance.9"
Since FTC procedure is largely a product of the Commission's own
lawlike procedural rules, innovation to remove bottlenecks and speed
processing of complaints is already within its power. A fruitful example
of such procedural innovation within the Commission's traditional powers is the Proposed Complaint filed against the plastics industry on
May 30, 1973. The gravamen of the proposed complaint was that
testers, manufacturers, and marketers of cellular polyurethane and
polystyrene plastics used for insulating and furnishing dwellings continued to designate these plastics as non-burning or self-extinguishing long
after they became aware that their current methods for determining the
flammability of the plastics were invalid and that such plastics posed a
4
serious fire hazard.
A.B.A., REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COM1-3 (1969).
93. E. Cox et al., THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 6263 (1969).
94. Proposed FTC Complaint Against Plastics Industry, No. 616 ATRR, D-1 (June
92.

MISSION,

5, 1973).

129

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 107

The proposed complaint showed innovations in three areas:
(1) Unlike past class actions, it covered an entire industry; the
named respondents alone included 26 producers and marketers.
(2) A trade group and a standards setting organization were
named respondents although it is rare for the FTC to take
action against nonprofit corporations.
(3)
The unfair practice complained of included a breach of the
respondents' duty to carry out precautionary and remedial
actions to warn past purchasers that the plastics they had
purchased actually constituted a substantial fire hazard.
The FTC's position that respondents violate the statute
when they fail to take those remedial actions expected of
reasonable persons is an unusual,
but creative, way of ap95
plying the statutory standard.
In addition to those remedies already available to the FTC for improving its performance without rule-making, several statutory improvements for the FTC are already pending in Congress. For exampie, S. 356, recently passed in the Senate, permits the Commission to:
(1) move against acts "affecting commerce" instead of only acts
"in commerce," as before;
(2) commence civil actions for penalties up to $10,000 against
persons who knowingly engage in practices which are unfair
or deceptive to consumers, and are prohibited by Section
5(a)(1) of the FTCA;
(3) seek specific redress for injuries to consumers caused by an
act or practice ultimately prohibited by a final cease and
desist order;
(4) bring suit for civil penalties of up to $10,000 for violations
of a cease and desist order;
(5) represent itself in court in situations where it previously relied on the Attorney General;
(6) seek temporary and preliminary injunctions.9"
Thus, even without substantive rule-making, it is unlikely that the Commission will have much excuse for being ineffective now or in the future.
But even if substantive rule-making is the sine qua non of efficient
FTC enforcement, it would appear that just as rule-making, rather than
agency adjudication, is the favored method of agency policy innovation, Congressional lawmaking, rather than judicial extrapolation, is
95. Id.
96. "Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act,"
As Passed by the Senate on September 12, 1973, No. 630, ATRR, D-1 (September 18,
1973). Subsequently, a bill incorporating some of these improvements was enacted.
Pub. L No. 93-153 (Nov. 16, 1973).
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the preferred method of legitimating questionable claims to new agency
powers. This is especially true where, as here, the agency has not shown
that it is asserting the new powers primarily to protect classes which
have been relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as

to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process. 9"
Next considered is whether the legislative history of the FTCA is an
ambiguous guide to interpreting Section 6(g) of the FTCA, as found
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in National
Petroleum. First, Section 6(g) is a part of the original, unamended,
FTCA which forbade only "unfair methods of competition" and was

primarily considered an antitrust act.9
In the Presidential campaign of 1912, which preceded the passage
of the FTCA by two years, all three political parties, Democratic, Progressive and Republican, wanted to make the antitrust laws more specific
and effective. Support for reform came from businessmen, who were
exasperated by the uncertainty of relying on the Supreme Court's "rule
of reason" 99 interpretation of the Sherman Act, 100 and those who found
that the Sherman Act, either because of original defects or judicial construction had proven ineffective.' 0 '
97. Quaere: assuming that the process of Congressional legislation is a kind of
"rule-making," was the court of appeals following its own advice that:
Rulemaking, unlike adjudication, gives notice to an entire segment of society
of those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming . . . and an opportunity
for persons affected to be heard. . . . By exposing [themselves] to a wider
range of criticism and advice than is ordinarily available in adjudicatory proceedings [those who formulate the rule] may . . .discover that they are not
always repositories of ultimate wisdom; they learn from the suggestions of
outsiders and often benefit from that advice.
National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
98. As one early authority noted:
It should not be forgotten that the Federal Trade Commission was organized
primarily to deal with the trust problem, the problems of monopoly and restraint of trade. All other matters were incidental. . . . Even in the field of
misbranding and of deceptive advertising, valuable though the work has been,
the Commission's jurisdiction has been a more or less fortuitous by-product
rather than the result of a clear legislative design. Probably if the question of
merchandise misbranding had been taken up on the merits, a law similar to
the Food and Drugs Act would have been drafted, with its effective combination of administrative and criminal enforcement.
G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 339 (1924).
99. The Supreme Court first enunciated the "rule of reason" in Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911), Chief Justice White summarized the ruling
in Standard Oil as follows:
[T]he duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general character of
the term restraint of trade required that the words restraint of trade should
be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract
and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels
of interstate commerce-the free movement of which it was the purpose of the
statute to protect.
100. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
101. G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 17 (1924).
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To free this historical analysis from anachronisms, one must forget
about most of the current independent regulatory agencies, such as the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC),102 Federal Power Commission (FPC), 1° Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) ,104 Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) 10 5 and National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB),' ° 6 none of which was yet even a gleam in Congress' legislative eye in 1914, the year of the passage of the FTCA.
At that time, the doctrine that Congress could never delegate any of
its legislative powers, while making certain grudging accommodations to
the needs of twentieth century government, was still a potent legal taboo.
In our own time, the Supreme Court has said that "[d]elegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion
of legislative power does not become a futility."' 7 But in 1911, an
earlier opinion of the same Court sustained a statute which gave the
Secretary of Agriculture the power to protect public forest preserves,
permitting him to promulgate what amounted to substantive criminal
laws. Denying the functional equivalence of laws and lawlike rules and
calling attention to the modesty of the delegation the court held:
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President
is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.".

. .

.

But the authority to make administrative rules

is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised
from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense.
The Secretary of Agriculture could not make rules and regulations
for any and every purpose. .

.

.

[AIll relate to matters clearly

indicated and authorized by Congress. The subjects as to which
108
the Secretary can regulate are defined ....
In drafting the FTCA, Congress could draw on the variety of legal
forms present in the embryonic development of the only prior independent regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission. In
1887, the ICC was given the power, after conducting an investigation of a complaint and preparing a report of its findings, to order
common carriers to cease and desist (1) from charging unjust and unreasonable rates and (2) from practicing undue discrimination between
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

48 Stat. 1066 (1934).
41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
52 Stat. 980 (1938).
48 Stat. 385 (1934).
49 Stat. 449 (1935).
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521-22 (1911).
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shippers by such methods as rebates.1" 9 ICC cease and desist orders
were to be enforced by the Commission or an interested party in an
equity proceeding in a circuit court of the United States in which
the Commission's report of the facts would be prima facie evidence. 110
In 1906, the Hepburn Act gave the ICC the power, after full hearing
on a complaint, to determine that the rates or practices of a common
carrier were unjust or unreasonable and to prescribe what would be
the maximum just and reasonable rates or fair and reasonable practices to be thereafter followed. Enforcement of ICC orders was now
primarily by suits for civil penalties brought by the Attorney General,
and by equity suits for specific performance in the Commerce Court
brought by the ICC. The Commerce Court was to issue injunctions
if the ICC order was regularly made. Evidently, ICC orders were
treated as lawlike. 1 1'
Finally, in 1910, the ICC was permitted to change existing rates or
practices or to challenge new rates or practices on its own motion. It
was still required to hold hearings before issuing orders determining
rates and prescribing practices. Enforcement of ICC orders remained
primarily by suits for civil penalties and by equity suits in the Com112
merce Court.
The FTC, as created by the FTCA of 1914, could take affirmative
action on its own, after issuing a complaint and holding an adjudicatory
hearing, to order a respondent to cease and desist from an "unfair
method of competition in commerce."'1 3 Although today the burden
is on the respondent so ordered to stay the order by petitioning a circuit
court for review," 4 in the original Act the FTC was required to go into
a circuit court for equitable enforcement of its order. In such enforcement suits the Commission's findings as to the facts, if supported by
testimony, would be conclusive." 5 Thus, aside from its power to proceed spontaneously, the FTC, as created in the 1914 Act, was an enforcement agency with only slightly more power than the weak ICC
created in 1887. It could neither prescribe what practices would be
fair and reasonable in the future or expect its orders to be given the
same narrow review given to the ICC's orders since 1906; though its
109.

The Supreme Court held that this grant of a power to condemn rates conferred

no power to set them for the future. ICC v. Cincinnati Ry., 167 U.S. 479 (1897).
110.

111.

24 Stat. 384 (1887).

34 Stat. 584, 589-91 (1906).

112. 36 Stat. 551 (1910).

113. 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
114.

15 U.S.C. § 45(g)(1) (1970).

115. 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
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findings of fact were to be conclusive if supported by the evidence.
While ICC orders since 1906 could not be ignored without incurring
civil penalties, no one need obey an FTC order until the FTC won a
judgment in a circuit court.
Actually the FTC, as finally created in 1914, was only the latest
of a series of efforts to curb corporations' anti-competitive practices.
In 1903, Congress had created a Bureau of Corporations within the
Department of Commerce and Labor for the purpose of investigating
corporations engaged in interstate commerce so as to make information concerning such corporations available to the President, Congress,
and the public. Although it had no enforcement powers over corporations, this Bureau could compel testimony and documents in the same
manner as the ICC. The President was expected to use such information to make recommendations to Congress for legislation to regulate
corporations engaged in commerce.1 16
Another proposal introduced in the Senate in 1912 called for a commission without any enforcement powers that could both investigate
and publicly report on corporations and also assist the federal courts
11 7
as a special master by drafting decrees in Sherman Act antitrust suits.
A plan for a commission that could issue orders to halt unfair competitive practices was introduced in the House in 1913 by the Progressive
Party leader, Congressman Murdock of Kansas."1 8 A licensing approach was put forward by Senator Newlands of Nevada in 1911 in a
bill which would have created a commission to license corporations
whose gross annual receipts exceeded five million dollars and require
them to submit annual reports. The license of a corporation found to
have engaged in "unfair or oppressive methods of competition" would
be subject to revocation and the defendant corporation could then be
ordered not to engage in interstate commerce." 9 These proposals.,
while not voted upon, indicate that the Congress had been exposed to a
great variety of schemes for improving antitrust regulation.
Enactment of the FTC began modestly on January 20, 1914 when
12 0
President Wilson, in his address before both Houses of Congress,
announced that his antitrust game plan called for enactment of a
tough new antitrust law, specifying with greater particularity than did
116.

32 Stat. 827 (1903); Compare the following provisions of the FTCA, 15

U.S.C. §§ 46(a), 46(f), 46(h), 49 (1970).

117. S. 5485, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912); Compare with similar provisions in the
FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 47 (1970).
118. H.R. 9299, H.R. 9300, H.R. 9301, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913).
119.
120.

S. 2941, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1911).
51 CONG. REC. 1962-64 (1914).
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the Sherman Act a list of anti-competitive practices to be enforced by
penal sanctions. An independent interstate trade commission would
take over the investigative duties of the Bureau of Corporations, and
be able to assist the Justice Department and the courts in framing
antitrust decrees and settlements. 2 ' The commission would have had
the power to compel testimony, information and reports from corpor122
ations, but not to exercise any antitrust enforcement powers.
Representative Clayton of Alabama and Senator Newlands of Nevada
almost immediately introduced the Administration's bill for a trade
2
commission without enforcement powers.'1
In the House, the bill creating the trade commission, as redrafted by
Representative Covington of Maryland,12 was reported out of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 1 25 over strong
objections in minority reports by Representative Stevens of New Hampshire' 26 and Representative Lafferty of Oregon 1 27 that the commission lacked enforcement powers, and that it did not give the commission substantive rule-making power to prohibit unfair methods of competition.
Section 8 of the Covington bill provided:
[T]he Commission may from time to time make rules and regulations and classifications of corporations
for the purpose of car128
rying out the provisions of this act;
and this provision was clearly understood to refer only to the power
to elaborate in detail which businesses would be subject to its reporting
29
requirements. 1
During the passage of the Administration's bill in the House, four
amendments attempting to give the commission enforcement powers
were rejected:
(1) Representative Morgan of Oklahoma's amendment would
have given the commission the power to declare rules to
prevent corporations from engaging in unfair
competition or
130
unjust discrimination between competitors.
(2) Representative Murdock of Kansas' amendment would have
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. H.R. 12120, S. 4160, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
See also 51 CoNG. REc.
2142-44 (1914).
124. H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
125. 51 CoNG. REC. 8840 (1914); H.R. Rep. No. 553, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914).
126. H.R. Rep. No. 553, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1914).
127. H.R. Rep. No. 553, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 19-26 (1914).
128. H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1914).
129. 51 CONG. REc. 8842-44 (1914) (statement of Congressman Covington); id.
at 9047-48 (statement of Congressman Towner of Iowa).

130.

51 CONG. REc. 9047, 9050 (1914).
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given the commission the power to halt a carefully defined
list of practices constituting unfair or oppressive competition
13
and also given the commission some price-fixing powers. 1
Representative Dillon of South Dakota's amendment would
have given the commission
both substantive rule-making
32
and adjudicatory powers.1
A second amendment by Representative Morgan would
have allowed
the commission adjudicatory and price-fixing
133
powers.

Final passage of the trade commission bill in the House occurred on
June 5, 1914.1'4
Shortly after the passage of the bill in the House, President Wilson announced that he had changed his position and now supported giving
the proposed commission enforcement powers to deal with anti-competitive practices, apparently because he had become convinced that
precise definition of all future unfair trade practices was impractic13 5
able.
The bill reported from the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce 136 provided for a commission with both investigative and enforcement powers, but it did not have a procedural rule-making provision such as Section 8 of the House bill. After debate and passage in the
Senate on August 5, 1914, both bills went to the House-Senate conference committee, which was limited to framing a bill resolving the
37
differences between the two Houses.
The conference committee drafted the FTCA of 1914, which the
conferees assured the Congress did not go beyond the conference
committee's mandate. 13 Section 8 of the House bill had disappeared
during the conference and the present Section 6(g) was written in.
While the final debates in the House and Senate before the passage
of the conference bill did not focus on the change in the rules provision,
they did clearly indicate Congress' concern that it was not giving the
FTC power to prescribe how businesses should be run in the future,
as had been given to the ICC. This power to legislate future practices
was convolved with the scope of the judicial review of the commission's orders. If the FTC did have the power to legislate future prac131. Id. at 9050-51, 9055.
132. Id. at 9056, 9057.
133. Id. at 9066, 9067.
134. Id. at 9910.
135. A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 434-38 (Paper ed. 1965).
136. S. 4160, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); 51 CoNG. REC. 10376, 10377-78 (1914).
137. JEFFERSON'S MANUAL 546; See House Rule XXVIII(3) (1971); RULES AND
MANUAL OF THE U.S. SENATE (1965).
138. 51 CONG. REc. 14769, 14925

136

(1914).
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tices, since the source of this power Was Congress' delegation, only
narrow judicial review was possible. Conversely, if Congressional
delegation was not involved, the agency, a factfinder and not a true
court, would be subject to judicial review. Of necessity this judicial
review would include an independent judicial finding as to the law,
even though the commission's expert findings in this area were expected to be given considerable weight.' 39 Final passage of the Act occurred in the Senate on September 8, and in the House on September 10,
and the bill was signed by the President on September 26, 1914.
Nowhere does the legislative history reveal that Congress contemplated that the FTC would attempt to reduce the Section 5(b) adjudications to mere determinations that the respondents had violated
pre-judicial rules defining unfair practices drafted by the Commission at
rule-making sessions. And while one cannot deny that the promulgation of trade regulation rules by the FTC would probably sit well with
Progressives like Lafferty and Murdock, such a practice appears beyond the intentions of many others who voted for what they were assured was an agency which would proceed only by adjudication to halt
recent or continuing unfair practices of individual respondents. 40
139. Consider the distinctions made by Representative Stevens of Minnesota in the
following colloquy with Representative Sherley during the debates which preceded the
passage of the conference bill in the House:
Mr. STEVENS of Minnesota. * * * The Supreme Court has held that the
Interstate Commerce Commission does exercise the right of determining whether
a rate in existence is unreasonable or unjust. That is a quasi-judicial act
and the decision of the commission on that point is reviewable by the courts,
because it is a review of a legal decision upon a given state of facts. But
when the commission goes further and decides what must be a reasonable rate
or practice for the future, of course that is a legislative act which must not and
can not be reviewed by the courts any more than could an act of Congress be
so reviewed. There is that distinction, and we have carried that distinction
into this bill. Whenever the trade commission decides that a certain act is an
act of unfair method of competition, the decision on that point as a question
of law is, and ought to be, reviewable by the courts. The facts themselves
are found by the commission. Its finding as to the facts is conclusive. Its
opinion as to whether that state of acts constitutes an act violating the law
is its judgment of law upon the facts, and its judgment is and ought to be reviewed, and it is so provided by this bill.
Mr. SHERLEY. If the gentlemen will permit, the Federal trade commission differs from the Interstate Commerce Commission in that it has no affirmative power to say what shall be done in the future?
Mr. STEVENS of Minnesota. Certainly.
Mr. SHERLEY. In other words, it exercises in no sense a legislative function such as is exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission?
Mr. STEVENS of Minnesota. Yes. The gentleman is entirely right. We desired clearly to exclude that authority from the power of the commission.
We did not know as we could grant it anyway. But the time has not arrived
to consider or discuss such a question.
51 CONG. REc. (Part 15) 14938 (1914).
140. Representative Covington made this point clear in the post-conference debates
in the House:
The function of the Federal trade commission will be to determine whether an
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The court of appeals in National Petroleum argues that the conference committee had the authority to draft substantive rule-making
power into Section 6(g) of the FTCA:
The original House bill contained a rule making provision
granting authority roughly commensurate with the powers of investigation the committee was then designed to have. While the
Senate bill deleted any such authority, we believe it can be persuasively argued that by reinserting a rule making provision into
the stronger commission bill all the conference did was reinstate
the principle of the House bill as to rule making-that is, permitting the commission to exercise authority roughly commensurate with its other powers, great or small. In this sense, the inviolence to
sertion of Section 6(g), as interpreted here, does no
4
the principle limiting the authority of the conference.' '
This exercise of logic by the court would appear to be somewhat
strained.142

In a similar vein, the court maintains that FTC trade regulation rules
"are merely norms . . . with no legal effect whatever"'' 14 because absent an FTC order to cease and desist, there is no penalty for disobeying
the trade regulation rule. But when one considers the Commission's
avowed intention to use its extensive agency resources to enforce these
rules in proceedings where the legality of the rules is not at issue
until the respondent has run the gauntlet of FTC enforcement actions
and has successfully petitioned a circuit court of appeals for review, one
finds it hard to agree with the National Petroleum court that such rules
have no legal effect.
Summarizing, while the legislative history amply supports the court's
finding that "the question of promulgating rules to elaborate the statutory standard and then relying on them in subsequent adjudications was
a practice that simply failed to preoccupy those engaging in the postexisting method of competition is unfair, and if it finds it to be unfair, to order the discontinuance of its use. In doing this it will exercise power of a judicial nature.
51 CONG. REc. 14932 (1914). Similar assurances were made by Senator Cummins in
the Senate; he stated that the FTC would only have the adjudicative powers exercised
by the ICC prior to 1906 and specifically would not have substantive rule-making powers like those given to the ICC in 1906. 51 CoNG. REC. 12917 (1914).
141. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 704 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
142. Using similar reasoning, one might maintain that if the House passed a defense bill authorizing purchase of 50 destroyers for the Navy, and the Senate passed
a bill authorizing purchase of 50 anti-tank guns for the Army, the conference bill
could authorize the Navy to purchase submarines and the Army to purchase tanks
because the House bill gave the Navy all the tanks it could use and the Senate bill
gave the Army all the submarines it could use.
143. National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 707 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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conference debates," 14' 4 the history does not appear sufficiently ambiguous to support a finding that such an innovation is consistent with
the FTCA's original statutory scheme; neither does it support a finding of
a congressional consensus that the rule-making provisions of Section 6 (g)
mandated a type of discretionary power potent enough to make the adjudications of Section 5(b) little more than inquiries into whether the
respondent has had the temerity to act in defiance of the agency's
prejudicial determination of his rights.
CONCLUSION

As a consequence of Congress' tendency to delegate new tasks of enforcement to the FTC without mandating a corresponding increase in
agency power, the agency has been led to seek significant additional
powers in the courts, formulating a rationale for judicial re-evaluation of
its original rule-making powers. This attempt has been successful in
at least one court, but it leaves unanswered the question as to the ultimate ambit of these new rules.
DAVID SAUL GUTTMAN

144.

Id. at 706.

